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Introduction 
Application of biotechnology in agriculture is expected to provide significant consumer 
and producer benefits, the magnitude and distribution of which depend critically on the structure 
of the markets via which the innovation effects are realized, as well as on the behavior of the 
market participants. In the paper, a dynamic model of diffusion of a supply-push genetically 
modified (GM) crop technology is developed and the model’s simulation results are presented. 
For calibration purposes, the structure and database of the U.S. soybean complex are used.
1 The 
novelty of the model is in explicitly accounting for the possibility of oligopsony power and 
strategic interaction (otherwise called the ‘buyer power’) of the companies in the crop processing 
sector, the reality of which is a growing concern in many agricultural markets in the U.S. The 
model also incorporates such important determinants of the diffusion process as the crop 
growers’ path dependent adoption behavior and other relevant characteristics, as well as the 
identity preservation and segregation requirements. As soybean market structure and the nature of 
GM soybeans are typical for many agricultural markets, our results are applicable to the analysis 
of diffusion of other GM crops.  
  The GM (Roundup Ready) soybeans have been designed to be resistant to glyphosate - a 
powerful herbicide that severely damages traditional (non-GM) soybeans. This improvement 
classifies GM soybeans as a supply-push, or process, innovation that saves on the growers’ 
production and management costs.  
In the last twenty years, the soybean processing industry, to which soybean growers sell 
most of their output, has become significantly more concentrated than most other U.S. food 
processing industries (Larson, 1998). At present, the four largest processing firms own about 80 
percent of the industry’s total capacity. There are also indications of an increasing real value of 
the soybean processing, or crush, margin as compared to the breakeven level in crushing (Shaub 
et al., 1988; Soya and Oilseed Bluebook, 2000). Soybean growers, however, are competitive. 
These stylized facts are indicative of the potential oligopsony market power that processing firms 
may be able to exercise in the purchase of soybeans. 
In order to analyze how market power in processing may impact diffusion of a new 
technology such as GM soybeans, a vertical market structure is assumed where competitive 
growers sell soybeans to a concentrated processing sector that handles and processes soybeans 
                                                 
1 The terms GM soybeans and GM crop are therefore used interchangeably throughout the paper.      3  
 
via means of crushing them into soy-oil and soy-meal, which are subsequently sold to food 












                 
 





The processing firms react to introduction of the GM soybeans that save on growers’ costs by 
making their strategic output and pricing decisions subject to each other’s responses, and to the 
adoption behavior and other characteristics of soybean growers. 
We find that more competitive processing industry facilitates the diffusion of a GM crop, 
which benefits both growers and consumers. Finite adjustment speed of the GM crop supply, 
which is shown to reflect adoption behavior of the crop growers, impedes the diffusion process 
but benefits agricultural producers in the long run. Producer heterogeneity with respect to 
profitability of the GM soybeans is also an important determinant of the diffusion process, as it 
results in lower adoption levels and higher price of the GM crop. High levels of heterogeneity are 
also likely to speed up the diffusion process but, depending on the way heterogeneity is modeled 
and parameter values, do not necessarily increase the total surplus. High discount rates shorten 
the adoption period and increase the total surplus, together with GM soybean output and price. 
I  In section 1, we briefly discuss the mechanism of adoption of agricultural innovation by 
the growers and describe the dynamic model of GM soybeans adoption. Due to the space 
limitations, details of the model setup and calibration data are available from the authors upon 





1. The Mechanism of GM Technology Diffusion 
 
In modeling the adoption behavior of soybean growers, the probit  and  epidemic 
approaches to innovation diffusion are appealed to, both of which have received a good deal of 
empirical support.  The probit approach assumes potential adopters to be heterogeneous with 
Soybean Growers
Processing Companies 
(handle soybeans and 
produce meal an oil) 
Food processors  Cattle Growers     4  
 
respect to the relative profitability of the new technology (Stoneman, 1983). Adoptions occur at 
different times because the price of the innovation decreases exogenously due to accumulation of 
experience and supply growth. We modify this approach by assuming that the GM technology 
price remains constant but that the strategic behavior of processing firms in the soybean market 
causes endogenous GM crop price changes. Grower heterogeneity with respect to GM- soybean 
profitability occurs due to differing levels of weed infestation, levels of farm income, contractual 
relations with buyers or suppliers, and the possibility of cross-pollination of neighboring crops. 
With these specifications, the long-run supply of GM soybeans is more price inelastic than the 
supply of non-GM soybeans.  
A drawback to the probit approach is that it ignores any uncertainty associated with the 
GM technologies, and thus makes no distinction between the short and long run demand for it. To 
account for this uncertainty, we also introduce the epidemic model of the growers’ adoption 
behavior. The approach assumes uncertainty, or lack of information, about the profitability of a 
new technology on behalf of potential adopters, and thus emphasizes learning about it as the 
information becomes more widespread over time (Griliches, 1957; Mansfield, 1968). The 
proportion of non-users currently adopting the new technology is determined by the proportion of 
those who have already adopted it, the cornerstone of this reasoning being that delayed adoption 
reflects the uncertainty that firms attach to future profit streams which, in turn, depends on the 
speed of learning from existing users’ experience. 
The epidemic approach was initially applied to explaining adoption patterns of hybrid 
corn in the U.S. (Griliches). Subsequent research on adoption, however, has focused on a more 
general concept of the so-called effective information hypothesis under which adoption of new 
technology is determined by the quantity and quality of relevant information as perceived by the 
potential adopters (Fischer et al., 1996). Recently, Marra, Hubbel, and Carlson (2001) found that 
the most important factors in farmers’ decisions to adopt Bt cotton were the on-farm experience 
and current county and state adoption and yield levels, which stresses the importance of 
information “nearness” and reduction of  “noise”.  
Following the effective information hypothesis, GM soybean adoption decisions in the 
present model are influenced not only by current demand for GM soybeans, but also by private 
observations of recent profitability and adoption levels. This backward-looking behavior (delayed 
adoption effect) has important implications for the dynamics of the adoption process, particularly 
in the market for soybeans, as represents a constraint on the oligopsonists’ intertemporal profit 
maximization behavior and creates additional incentives to expand GM soybean purchases.  
In the model, soybean processors are assumed to be risk-averse and to know the growers’ 
adoption behavior. The goal of each processing firm is to maximize the present value of its crush 
margins on both non-GM and GM soybeans minus the costs of identity preservation (IP). The IP 
costs are modeled as a function of the proportion of GM soybean production and facility 
management efficiency. The adoption process starts at the moment of introduction of GM 
soybeans, after which processors play a dynamic oligopsony game by strategically setting the 
quantities of GM and non-GM soybeans purchased from the growers. The soybean futures 
market is not modeled explicitly; instead it is assumed that either processors have market power 
there or growers do not take full advantage of hedging.  
The model is calibrated with data from agricultural statistical sources and previous 
research. Due to the complexity of the analytical solution of the model, sensitivity analysis is 
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2. Simulation  Results   
Due to the impaired tractability of analytical comparative statics and dynamics analysis of 
the adoption process as specified in the solution to the model, we use numerical simulation to 
examine the model’s behavior. In particular, we are interested in how the model’s parameters 
affect the diffusion dynamics and equilibrium prices and outputs of GM and traditional soybeans, 
as well as the magnitude and distribution of gains realized due to the innovation adoption. The 
software used for the simulation is MATLAB. Below, we present results of sensitivity analysis 
with respect to the number of firms in the processing market, growers’ adoption behavior, 
growers’ heterogeneity with respect to profitability of GM soybeans, and the discount factor. Our 
results are by no means exhaustive, but we believe that the most important determinants of the 
diffusion process of biotechnological innovations have been considered.  
 
Number of processing firms in the raw soybean market.  
Interesting results are obtained by varying the number of soybean processing firms, which 
reflects the processor oligopsony power. A more competitive market leads to greater realization 
of the producer cost savings that GM soybeans offer, which implies a higher long run equilibrium 
share and price of GM soybeans with correspondingly lower share and price for non-GM 
soybeans. In compliance with the general results of the dynamic oligopoly theory with Nash-
Cournot behavior, a more competitive processing sector in our model means that the processors 
garner a lower share of the cost savings from the GM technology, while grower and consumer 
surplus are larger. Market characteristics approach competitive levels as the number of firms 
increase. 
Table 1:  Stationary Equilibrium Price, Quantity, and Gross Processing Margins with 
Varying Number of Firms  
Number of processing firms  1  2  3  10  100 
GM soybean price                                   ($/ton)  134 165 180 207 220 
Traditional soybean price                       ($/ton)  144 114 102.4 74.7  65.4 
GM soybean output                          (mill. tons)  21 27.5  30 36 38 
Traditional soybean output              (mill. tons) 22.5 16  13.5 7.5  5.5 
Aggregate processing margin               (mill. $)  6375 5913 5465 4216 3401 
* s=0.5 
 
The number of processing firms also affects the dynamics of diffusion. The length of the 
adoption process, defined as the time it takes the variables to come arbitrarily close to their 
stationary values, is negatively correlated with the number of processors: in a more competitive 
market, the firms will expand their purchases of GM soybeans faster because of the pre-emptive 
incentive to seize market share before rival processors do it. With fewer processors, however, it is 
rational to first start buying only the cheapest GM soybeans from those growers who enjoy the 
highest cost savings from the new technology and then to gradually expand GM soybean 
purchases, keeping prices low because of the slow, or “retarded”, GM soybean supply response. 
Table 2 and the diagrams below provide an illustration.  
 
Table 2: Response of model to increasing number of processing firms  
Share of GM soybeans  ↑         Total surplus  ↑ 
Share of non-GM soybeans  ↓         Grower surplus  ↑ 
Price of GM soybeans  ↑         Consumer surplus  ↑     6  
 
Price of traditional soybeans  ↓         Processor surplus  ↓ 





In the feedback version of the model, the results discussed above would be similar, but 
with the stationary values reflecting more competitive behavior. The intuition behind this is that 
the GM soybean price being below its long-run value encourages the rivals’ purchases of the GM 
crop transition to the new technology (which is identical to the argument that capacity building 
encourages investment in standard models). Under the feedback assumptions, there are stronger 
incentives to “invest” into GM soybeans now rather than later as a means of preempting the 
rivals’ expansion into the GM market.  
     7  
 
Growers’ adoption behavior. As discussed in Section 2, the growers’ adoption behavior is 
summarized by the parameter s, which is the speed of the GM soybean supply adjustment, 
reflecting producer perception of uncertainty about the crop, importance of past and current 
adoption levels for price expectation, and availability and speed of dissemination of information 
affecting planting decisions.     
Simulation results indicate that slow supply adjustment leads to a higher long-run share 
and price of GM soybeans, but has the opposite effect on non-GM soybeans. Higher values of s, 
however, are also associated with serious delays in the adoption process, which makes the 
welfare effects ambiguous (see Tables 3 and 4).  
 
Table 3: Stationary Values (n=4) 
S 0.1  0.35  0.5  0.75  0.9  1 
GM soybean price                             ($/ton)  207 191 188 186 186.5  185 
Traditional soybean price                 ($/ton)  74.7 88.5 90.8 93.1 94  95 
GM soybean output                    (mill. tons)  36 33 32.5  32 31.8  31.6 
Traditional soybean output       (mill. tons)  7.5 10.5  11  11.5  11.7  11.9 





Table 4: Model’s sensitivity to producer  uncertainty  
Share of GM soybeans  ↑          Total surplus  c 
Share of non-GM soybeans  ↓          Grower surplus  c 
Price of GM soybeans  ↑          Consumer surplus  c 
Price of non-GM soybeans  ↓          Processor surplus  ↓ 
Adoption time  ↑ 






The lagged adoption behavior of the growers appears to be an imperfect substitute for 
their market, or bargaining, power vis-à-vis the crop processors. Uncertainty associated with 
future demand for GM crops and slow dissemination of relevant information prevents producers 
from reacting competitively, or quickly, enough to the incentives from the processors. In the post-
adoption period, this is reflected by the fact that the steady state GM soybean output and price are 
higher with finite speed of supply adjustment. Simulation results suggest that, in the long run, the 
growers benefit from their GM adoption behavior. Depending on parameter values, slow GM 
soybean supply adjustment may or may not result in greater NPV of consumer and producer 
surplus.      9  
 
An important consideration is the significance of fast adoption from the perspective of the 
international competitiveness of the U.S. The reason is the international “spillovers” of 
agricultural innovations, in particular of biotechnologies. Biotechnology innovations may be 
adapted to different environments much faster than other agricultural innovations, for which 
location-specificity typically plays an important role (Moschini et al., 2000). Besides, 
biotechnology innovations are generated within multinational firms that are ideally positioned for 
worldwide marketing. While the sales of new technologies to countries that export competitive 
products increase the profitability of a multinational, they also undermine the U.S. 
competitiveness in exports of the final product. In case of soybeans, higher GM technology 
adoption rates abroad increase cost efficiency of other major world soybean producers, 
undermining the U.S. competitiveness in the international soybean market.  
 
Level of growers’ heterogeneity with respect to cost savings from the GM crop. The 
heterogeneity of the crop growers, modeled using the probit approach, is an important parameter 
in our results/construction as well.  
The model suggests that, the more heterogeneous the growers are with respect to GM crop 
profitability (the bigger the difference between the elasticities of the GM and non-GM crop 
supply functions), the lower will be the equilibrium GM crop output and the higher its relative 
price, the lower the aggregate processor profits, and the faster the adoption process. Table 5 and 
the figures provide an illustration of these results. 
 
Table 3: Model’s sensitivity to increasing producer heterogeneity with respect to cost 
savings from GM soybeans  
Share of GM soybeans  ↓          Total surplus  c 
Share of non-GM soybeans  ↑          Total producer surplus  c 
Price of GM soybeans  ↑          Consumer surplus  ↓ 
Price of non-GM soybeans  ↓          Processor surplus  ↓ 
Adoption time  ↓ 
   




While the welfare implications of adopters’ heterogeneity are parameter sensitive and 
therefore ambiguous, it is clear that the way a biotech innovation improves a crop affects the 
dynamics and equilibrium levels of, and hence the gains from, the diffusion process. According 
to our results, heterogeneity of potential adopters with respect to a particular innovation is an 
important economic consideration at the stage of innovation design.   
 
Discount rate. Different values of the discount rate (r) also affect both the speed of 
convergence and the stationary values. In compliance with the general dynamic oligopoly theory, 
the simulation results show that the higher the discount rate, the shorter the diffusion period, and 
the higher the steady state GM output and price. The welfare effects, however, are ambiguous 
and parameter sensitive. 
 
Table 3: Model’s sensitivity to increase in discount rate r  
Share of GM soybeans  ↑          Total surplus  c 
Share of non-GM soybeans  ↓          Total producer surplus  c 
Price of GM soybeans  ↑          Consumer surplus  c 
Price of non-GM soybeans  ↓          Processor surplus  c 
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5. Conclusions   
In the paper, a model of adoption and diffusion of a genetically modified (GM) crop 
technology has been developed. The model is specified as a dynamic Nash oligopsony game, in 
which oligopsonistic crop processing companies make their strategic production decisions taking 
into account adoption behavior of the crop growers, the GM crop characteristics, and identity 
preservation requirements. While the model is solved analytically, numerical simulation of GM 
soybean diffusion in the U.S. is used for sensitivity analysis.   
The simulation results show that competition in agricultural markets facilitates the process 
of a supply-push biotechnological innovation and increases adoption levels. On the other hand, 
oligopsonistic behavior of crop processors slows the diffusion process, while maintaining higher 
levels of traditional soybean production.  
Slow speed of GM crop supply adjustment, which is shown to reflect adoption behavior 
of the crop growers, impedes the diffusion process but benefits agricultural producers in the long 
run. Welfare results, however, are ambiguous as they are parameter sensitive. Slow diffusion may 
also hurt the U.S. international competitiveness.  
Higher producer heterogeneity with respect to profitability of the innovation results in 
lower equilibrium adoption levels and higher price of the GM crop. Higher levels of producer 
heterogeneity also speed up the diffusion process but, depending on the way heterogeneity is 
modeled, do not necessarily increase the surplus. It is certain that heterogeneity of potential 
adopters with respect to profitability of a particular innovation should be an important economic 
consideration at the stage of innovation design.   
Higher discount rates shorten the adoption period and increase equilibrium GM soybean 
output and price, as well as the total surplus. 
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